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I.

Introduction

As the United States continues to react to the September
11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade Center and the Pentagon, the
legal decisions regarding the trials of prisoners captured in
Afghanistan while fighting against the U.S. armed forces remain
unsettled. In January 2002, the United States military began
transporting these prisoners to the U.S. Naval Base in Guantanamo
Bay, Cuba. Since January 2002, approximately 600 to 800
detainees have been flown 8,000 miles from the U.S. base in
Kandahar, Afghanistan to the U.S. base in Cuba.1
Because the detainees are held by the U.S. military on what
is effectively U.S. territory, the U.S. government must decide, at
some point in the future, whether to release the detainees or to
criminally charge them. In order for the detainees to be criminally
tried, the government must decide in which court system their
trials will be held. If the detainees are tried as ordinary criminal
defendants in the U.S. court system, then their trials will likely be
held in the Article III courts, i.e. in the U.S. federal court system.
From the government’s perspective, however, the use of the
military justice system to try the detainees may be more
advantageous. In particular, trials before military tribunals need
not be open to the general public and may be conducted on an
expedited basis, permitting the quick resolution of individual cases
and avoiding disclosure of highly sensitive intelligence material,
which would be made public in an ordinary criminal trial in an
Article III court.
This article explores whether it is permissible for an Article
I court to try the accused detainees captured in Afghanistan and
detained on a U.S. Naval Base in Cuba. This article examines the
constitutionality of the legal options available to the U.S. in the
future trials of the detainees, assuming that all the detainees are
members of either the Taliban or Al Qaeda regime.2 It analyzes
1

Josef Braml, Bully or Benefactor? Rule of Law or Dictates by Fear: a German
Perspective on American Civil Liberties in the War Against Terrorism, 27
FLETCHER F. WORLD AFF. 115 (Summer/Fall 2003); Nauroz Shah, 25 More
Wahabis Arrive at Guantanamo Bay Base, June 11, 2002, at shianews.com.
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This assumption is based on the facts surrounding this international armed
conflict. As will be discussed below, the Taliban was the official government of

1

the jurisdiction of the military justice system as well as the federal
court system. Although this article focuses on Article I courtsmartial and not Article II military tribunals, a similar analysis and
policy considerations apply to military tribunals and commissions
created by the President in exercise of his Article II powers as
neither Article I or II tribunals are part of the independent federal
judiciary mandated by Article III.
In section II, this article provides the necessary background
information. It discusses the U.S. occupation of the naval base at
Guantanamo Bay, Cuba as well as the political history of
Afghanistan that gave rise to both the Taliban and Al Qaeda
Afghanistan. Therefore, it is reasonable to conclude that when the U.S. invaded
Afghani territory, the armed forces fighting against the U.S. armed forces were
those of the Taliban. As will also be discussed below, the Al Qaeda fighters
have long been a part of the fighting force in Afghanistan and were in a
symbiotic relationship with the Taliban government. Accordingly, it is also
reasonable to conclude that the fighters were members of Al Qaeda. In addition,
both the Taliban and Al Qaeda have openly spoken out against the U.S. and
have long had agendas opposed to the U.S. Plus, Al Qaeda has claimed
responsibility for numerous actions opposing the influence of the U.S. To
conclude that these organizations were the forces opposing the U.S. invasion is
therefore reasonable. See notes 23-59, infra, and accompanying text for a
thorough discussion.
Also, as will be discussed below, the U.S. military continues to question the
detainees regarding the planned activities of Al Qaeda. According to news
reports and government releases, the interrogations have been successful in
preventing Al Qaeda attacks around the world. This too leads to the conclusion
that many of the detainees are in fact members of Al Qaeda. See Bryan
Robinson, A Slow Process: Lies and Silence Hamper Intelligence-Gathering at
Guantanamo Bay, Apr. 10, 2002, at abcnews.com.
While it is possible that some detainees could be members of the Northern
Alliance in Afghanistan, this is unlikely as the Northern Alliance is now an ally
of the U.S. and has been fighting alongside the U.S. since the beginning of this
international armed conflict. See Thom Shanker, A Nation Challenged: The
Combat; U.S. Tells How Rescue Turned into Fatal Firefight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar.
6, 2002, at A1.
While it is also possible that the detainees could be members of different “war
lord” tribes of Afghanistan, this too is unlikely as the Taliban government was
successful in achieving one of its primary goals: the suppression of these tribes.
See AHMED RASHID, TALIBAN: MILITANT ISLAM, OIL AND FUNDAMENTALISM IN
CENTRAL ASIA (2001), for a thorough discussion. See also notes 23-59, infra,
and accompanying text.
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regimes. It describes the organizational structure of both the
Taliban and Al Qaeda regimes and reviews the U.S. government’s
position regarding the trials of the detainees. It also analyzes the
status of the detainees as prisoners of war and combatants subject
to a military tribunal under the Geneva Convention Relative to the
Treatment of Prisoners of War of August 12, 1949 (the “Geneva
Convention”)3 and the Uniform Code of Military Justice.4
In section III, the jurisdiction of Article I courts,
specifically military courts, is discussed. Section III also briefly
examines the law of war. Section IV discusses the establishment
of Article III courts, both in the U.S. and abroad. Section V
examines the domestic sources of extraterritorial jurisdiction of the
Article III courts. It also discusses war crimes and terrorism.
Section VI considers the geographical, practical, and political
limitations on Article I and III courts, most of which are common
to both court systems.
Section VII addresses the constitutional and practical
concerns when utilizing Article I courts in place of Article III
courts. It reviews the policies underlying the constitutional
requirement that the judicial power of the U.S. be confined to
Article III courts and applies a balancing test, considering both
constitutional and practical limitations. This section also considers
the doctrines of separation of powers and checks and balances.
Lastly, section VIII provides a conclusion that hopefully ensures
constitutional trials for the detainees as well as domestic and
international approval.

3

Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War of August
12, 1949 [hereinafter the “Geneva Convention”], 6 U.S.T. 3316.

4

Uniform Code of Military Justice [hereinafter “UCMJ”], 10 U.S.C. § 802 et
seq. (2002).

3

II.

The Historical Setting

A.

The United States in Cuba

At Guantanamo Bay, the U.S. has a naval base which, for
all practical purposes, is American territory.5 The U.S. leases this
base from Cuba and has done so since U.S. forces occupied Cuba
in 1903.6 Regarding the leased areas of land and water that
comprise the naval base, Cuba agreed that during the period of
occupation, the U.S. would exercise “complete jurisdiction and
control over and within said areas.”7 The U.S., in return,
recognized “the continuance of the ultimate sovereignty of Cuba
over and above the leased areas.”8 “Ultimate,” meaning final or
eventual, is the key word in this agreement. It means that Cuban
sovereignty is interrupted during the period of U.S. occupancy,
since the U.S. exercises complete jurisdiction and control, but in
case occupation is terminated, the area reverts to the ultimate
sovereignty of Cuba.9
The agreement regarding the naval base was later
confirmed by the Treaty of 1934 between the U.S. and Cuba,
signed at Washington on May 29, 1934.10 This treaty gives the
U.S. a perpetual lease on the naval base, capable of being voided
only by U.S. abandonment of the area or by mutual agreement
5

1 THE HISTORY OF GUANTANAMO BAY, ch. 3, available at
www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/history.htm (last modified Aug. 27, 2002) (last visited
Apr. 16, 2003).
6

Id.

7

Lease of Coaling or Naval Stations, Feb. 16-23, 1903, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No.
418, reprinted in THE HISTORY OF GUANTANAMO BAY, app. D, available at
www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/history.htm (last modified Aug. 27, 2002) (last visited
Apr. 16, 2003).
8

Id.

9

See id.

10

Treaty of 1934, May 29, 1934, U.S.-Cuba, T.S. No. 866, reprinted in THE
HISTORY
OF
GUANTANAMO
BAY,
app.
D,
available
at
www.nsgtmo.navy.mil/history.htm (last modified Aug. 27, 2002) (last visited
Apr. 16, 2003).
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between the two countries.11 Pursuant to the Treaty of 1934, the
U.S. has for approximately seventy years exercised the essential
elements of sovereignty over the U.S. Naval Base at Guantanamo
Bay, without actually owning it. Unless the U.S. abandons the
area or agrees to a modification of the terms of its occupancy, it
can continue in the present status as long as it likes. This territorial
status means that the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay are
effectively on U.S. soil.12

11

Id.

12

Notwithstanding the history of the Naval Base in Guantanamo Bay, Judge
Matz of the federal district court of California ruled that no federal court has
jurisdiction to hear the cases against the detainees as they are on Cuban soil.
Judge Matz pointed out that because the detainees were captured abroad and
remain abroad, they must be denied access to the U.S. federal courts. “They
have not stepped foot on American soil,” Judge Matz said. Barbara Whitaker,
Judge Denies Qaeda Captives a Day in Court, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at
A13.
The only other federal courts that have addressed the issue have held that
Guantanamo Bay is not within the sovereign territory of the United States and is
not the functional equivalent of U.S. sovereign territory. In Cuban American
Bar Assoc. v. Christopher, 43 F.3d 1412, 1425 (11th Cir. 1995), cert. denied,
515 U.S. 1142 and 516 U.S. 913 (1995), the Eleventh Circuit had to determine
whether Cuban and Haitian migrants temporarily detained at the Guantanamo
Bay Naval Base could assert rights under various U.S. statutes and the U.S.
Constitution. Id. at 1421. Citing the language of the lease agreement, the Court
of Appeals stated “the district court erred in concluding that Guantanamo Bay
was a ‘United States territory.’ We disagree that control and jurisdiction is
equivalent to sovereignty.” Id. at 1425. The Court of Appeals then went on to
reject the argument that U.S. military bases which are leased abroad and remain
under the sovereignty of foreign nations are “‘functionally equivalent’ to being
... within the United States.” Id. See also Bird v. United States, 923 F. Supp.
338, 342-43 (D. Conn. 1996) (holding that sovereignty over Guantanamo Bay
rested with Cuba and therefore plaintiff’s tort claim was barred under the
“foreign country” exception of the Federal Tort Claims Act).
For the purposes of this article, I will adhere to the history of the Naval base and
assume that it is U.S. territory because the above cases are distinguishable. All
the cases that the courts have heard regarding the status of Guantanamo Bay
have dealt with the rights of persons merely present at the naval base. The
courts presume that there is no jurisdiction when persons outside the U.S. seek
to assert rights that only persons within U.S. territory may assert. The holdings
in those cases follow that presumption. The cases against the detainees is
distinguishable because the detainees are not asserting rights under any U.S.

5

B. The Political History of Afghanistan
In 1973, Afghanistan became a republic and Sardar
Mohammed Daud became president.13 In order to crush a nascent
Islamic fundamentalist movement, Daud turned to the Soviet
Union for additional aid to try and modernize the state structure of
Afghanistan.14 From 1956 to 1978, the Soviet Union gave over
US$1 billion in economic aid and US$1.25 billion in military aid
to Afghanistan, as the Soviets welded the country into their sphere
of influence at the height of the Cold War.15 During the same
period, the U.S. gave Afghanistan US$533 million in total aid.16
Despite this aid, Daud failed to build institutions and a loose
centrally-administered bureaucracy was laid over the existing
society with little public representation.
Just five years later in 1978, Marxist sympathizers in the
army, who had trained in the Soviet Union, overthrew Daud in a
bloody military coup.17 Daud and his family were massacred.18
The communists, who were bitterly divided, began to fight among
themselves and their lack of understanding of Afghanistan’s
complex tribal society led to widespread rural revolts against
them.19 Within a few short months Afghanistan was catapulted
into the center of the intensified Cold War between the U.S. and
the Soviet Union.20

statute but rather are being held accountable for their actions and are being held
in U.S. military custody.
13

RASHID, supra note 2, at 12.

14

Id. at 12-13.

15

Id.

16

Id.

17

Id. at 13.

18

Id.

19

Id.

20

Id.
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With U.S. support, the Afghanis became anti-Soviet troops
in their fight to defeat outsiders who were trying to subdue them
and replace their time-honored religion and society with an alien
ideology and social system.21 Out of this conflict, which claimed
1.5 million Afghan lives between 1978 and 1989, emerged a group
of Islamic extremist Afghanis who called themselves Taliban, or
students of Islam.22
C. The Taliban’s Political and Military Organization
The Taliban was a structured government established in
1994, though that structure existed in theory only.23 In actuality,
the Taliban’s political and military decision-making process was
secretive, dictatorial, inaccessible, and highly centralized in Mullah
Omar, 24 who was elevated to Amir-al-Mumineen, Leader of the
Faithful, in 1996.25 The Taliban’s head decision-making body was
the Supreme Shura,26 known as the Kandahar Shura because it was
based in Kandahar, Afghanistan.27 Omar appointed all the original
ten members from among his friends and colleagues.28 Two other
Shuras reported to the Kandahar Shura: the Kabul Shura and the
military Shura.29

21

Id.

22

Id.

23

Id. at 95-104.

24

Id. at 95. It is also unrepresentative of the people and funds its operations with
illegal drug trade, id. at 98, 117-27, but those issues and others regarding the
legitimacy of the government are beyond the scope of this article.

25

Scott Johnson & Evan Thomas, Mullah Omar Off the Record, NEWSWEEK,
Jan. 21, 2002, at 26-28. It is unclear who “elevated” Omar to this status: others
within the Taliban or himself.

26

“Shura” is an Arabic term meaning “Islamic council.” RASHID, supra note 2,
at 244.

27

Id. at 98.

28

Id.

29

Id.

7

The Kabul Shura was designed to deal with the day-to-day
problems of the government and the city.30 The Kandahar Shura,
however, frequently revoked even minor decisions made by the
Kabul Shura.31 Underneath the Kabul Shura, the Taliban had
representatives such as the governor, mayor, police chiefs, and
senior administrators in the cities of Kabul, Herat, and Mazar.32
Omar prohibited these representatives from acquiring any local
power base and they had no real control or authority.33
The military Shura was a loose body that planned strategy
and implemented tactical decisions for the armed forces, but had
no decision-making powers.34 The head of the Taliban’s armed
forces was Omar, even though he had no official position.35 Under
Omar was the chief of general staff and then chiefs of staff for the
army and air force.36 There were at least four army divisions and
one armored division.37 There were officers and commanders, but
no clear military hierarchy.38 Omar constantly shifted unit
commanders around, often once a month, so that no commander
gained a power base in any one region.39 The Taliban armed
forces enlisted both short-term fighters and professionally trained
30

Id.

31

Id. For example, the Kandahar Shura has revoked simple decisions to grant
journalists permission to travel and to allow new U.N. aid projects within
Afghanistan. Id.
32

Id. at 98-99.

33

Id. This is part of the above-referenced Taliban goal to suppress various
“tribes” in Afghanistan. See note 2, supra.
34

RASHID, supra note 2, at 99.

35

Id. Full information regarding the Taliban military structure is unknown as it
is a highly secretive regime.
36

RASHID, supra note 2, at 99.

37

Id.

38

Id.

39

Id. Unfortunately for the Taliban, no commander gains much comprehensive
experience either. Id. This too is part of the Taliban’s above-referenced tactic
to prohibit the dominance of any “war lord” or “tribe.” See note 2, supra.
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soldiers.40 Essentially, the Taliban’s governmental and military
structures were only a shell within which Omar dictated.41
The Taliban regime was a mostly unopposed government
within Afghanistan, by Afghanis and other nations, from 1996 to
2001.42 Therefore, it is accurate to describe the Taliban as
Afghanistan’s legitimate government in 2001 when the U.S. began
its war against terrorism.43 Under international law, it is of no
consequence that the U.S. and other nations did not recognize the
Taliban as a legitimate government.44
D. The Structure of Al Qaeda
Al Qaeda’s formation began in 1982 when the U.S. and
British governments encouraged over 100,000 Muslim radicals,
from forty-three Islamic countries in the Middle East, North and
East Africa, Central Asia, and the Far East, to travel to Afghanistan
to fight side-by-side against the Soviet Union.45 Among these
thousands of recruits was a young Saudi student named Osama Bin
Laden, who became head of the network in 1989 and gave it the
name “Al Qaeda.”46 Al Qaeda, which is an Arabic word for
“military base,”47 is a worldwide network with no clear structure

40

RASHID, supra note 2, at 100. Presumably, the Taliban are these
professionally trained soldiers, drawn from the former anti-communist army. I
will assume, for the purposes of this article, that this presumption is correct.
41

See id. at 102, 104.

42

Id. at 102-04.

43

See Thom Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, Word for Word, the Geneva
Conventions: Who Is a Prisoner of War? You Could Look It Up. Maybe., N.Y.
TIMES, Mar. 10, 2002, sec. 4, p. 9, col. 1 (quoting Doug Cassell).
44

Analysis of Article 4(A)(1) is the same as an analysis of Article 4(A)(3) of the
Geneva Convention, which encompasses “[m]embers of regular armed forces
who profess allegiance to a government or an authority not recognized by the
Detaining Power.”

45

RASHID, supra note 2, at 128-30.

46

Id. at 131-32.

47

Id. at 132.
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and very little apparent hierarchy beyond its apex in Osama Bin
Laden.48
According to Jamal Ahmed al-Fadl, a former aide to Bin
Laden, Al Qaeda has a somewhat corporate structure.49 Beneath
the “emir,” as Bin Laden is called, sits a council of about twelve
advisers called the shura.50 The council included Bin Laden
confederates such as Muhammad Atef, an Egyptian who served as
military commander of Al Qaeda,51 and Ayman al-Zawahiri, who
led Egyptian Islamic Jihad, a terrorist group.52 It is unclear who
sits on the council now as numerous Al Qaeda members have been
killed or captured. Within Al Qaeda, there are two types of
operatives: (1) a sophisticated group that takes care of the
planning, intelligence gathering, surveillance, and bomb making;
and (2) the expendable operatives that carry out the attacks.53
Al Qaeda’s central function is to train militant Islamic
terrorists at its headquarter camps in Afghanistan.54 The Al Qaeda
network appears to be comprised of numerous cells, from Bosnia

48

Michael Elliott, Hate Club, TIME, Nov. 12, 2001, at 58. It is believed that
Abu Zubaydah (a Saudi-born Palestinian) was Al Qaeda’s director of
international operations. Id. Zubaydah was arrested in late March 2002 with the
help of Pakistani authorities. Deborah Charles, Zubaydah Arrest Helps Avert
New Attack on U.S.- FBI, REUTERS, Apr. 3, 2002.
49

Benjamin Wiser & Tim Golden, A Nation Challenged: Bin Laden’s Network;
Al Qaeda: Sprawling, Hard-to-Spot Web of Terrorists-in-Waiting, N. Y. TIMES,
Sept. 30, 2001, at B4.
50

Id. “Shura” is an Arabic term meaning “Islamic council.” RASHID, supra
note 2, at 244.
51

U.S. officials have said that Atef was killed in American air strikes on
Afghanistan. Charles Aldinger, Rumsfeld Slams ‘Hyper-Ventilation’ Over
Captives, REUTERS, Feb. 8, 2002.

52

Wiser & Golden, supra note 49.

53

Id. (relating account of Mohammed Saddiq Odeh, a Jordanian convicted in
Summer 2001 of helping plan the bombing of the U.S. Embassy in Nairobi).
54

Elliott, supra note 48.
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to the Philippines to Uganda,55 controlled by Bin Laden.56 In
addition to directing its own attacks, it acts as an umbrella group,
financing the operations of its widely-flung cells and providing
operatives in order to successfully carry out terrorist attacks
against all “infidels,” a term that includes both non-Muslims and
Muslims of “lesser” faith.57 It is unclear whether Bin Laden has
been aware of the domestic agendas of all the cells at all times.58
What is clear is that Bin Laden had considerable influence with the
Taliban and directly increased the Taliban’s hostility toward the
U.S., its allies, and Muslim regimes around the world.59
E. President Bush’s Executive Order Regarding the Trial of
the Taliban and Al Qaeda Detainees
In response to the attacks on the World Trade Center and
the Pentagon on September 11, 2001, President Bush began a “War
Against Terrorism.”60 The U.S. sent troops into Afghanistan in
November 2001 to fight and capture Taliban soldiers and Al Qaeda
operatives.61 On November 13, 2001, President Bush issued the
Military Order Regarding Detention, Treatment, and Trial of
Certain Non-Citizens in the War Against Terrorism (the “Military
Order”).62 In the Military Order, President Bush stated that the
55

Id. While many of the original Al Qaeda members were from Afghanistan
and other Arab nations, many of the new members were born and raised in the
Muslim communities of Europe. See id.

56

RASHID, supra note 2, at 136. The Al Qaeda network follows Bin Laden’s
fatwas (legal rulings issued by Islamic scholars) even though they carry no
moral weight in the Muslim world as Bin Laden is neither an Islamic scholar nor
a teacher and thus cannot legally issue fatwas.

57

Id.

58

Id.

59

Id. at 139.

60

See Jessica Wong, FAQ: Is the United States really “at war”?, CBC NEWS
ONLINE, Sept. 2001, at www.cbc.ca/news.
61

See Thom Shanker, A Nation Challenged: The Combat; U.S. Tells How
Rescue Turned into Fatal Firefight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at A1.

62

Military Order Regarding Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism [hereinafter “Military Order”], 66 Fed.
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U.S. intends to use military tribunals to try the Taliban and Al
Qaeda detainees captured while fighting against U.S. armed forces
in Afghanistan.63 The Military Order declares that the military
tribunals convened to try the Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees will
resemble ordinary courts-martial in some ways, but not in all.64 As
in an ordinary court-martial, a defendant will be given a military
lawyer and also may hire a civilian attorney, and the panels will
include three to seven officers.65 Conviction of any crimes will
require a two-thirds majority of the panel,66 unlike the unanimity
required for civilian trials.67
The tribunals, like courts-martial, will be able to consider
any punishment permitted by the law of war, including death
sentences,68 but any decision to impose such death sentence must
be unanimous.69 If convicted, a defendant could ask a special
review panel, consisting of three members, to re-evaluate the
case.70 The defendant could not, however, appeal to any federal
court.71 Notwithstanding the above limitations, the U.S. Supreme
Court is allowed to review certain cases that a military court
Reg. 57,833, § 1(e) (Nov. 13, 2001). While the military tribunal created by
President Bush is an Article II court, the same policy considerations and analysis
attach whether the military tribunal is ultimately created by the President or
Congress. For the purposes of this article, the phrase “Taliban and Al Qaeda
detainees” refers only to the detainees held at Guantanamo Bay.
63

Id.

64

Military Order, supra note 62; Anne Gearan, Tribunals to be Like CourtsMartial, ASSOCIATED PRESS, Mar. 20, 2002. The Military Order creates an
Article II tribunal rather than an Article I tribunal. This distinction is irrelevant
to the analysis.
65

Gearan, supra note 64; UCMJ, supra note 4, § 816(2)(A).

66

Military Order, supra note 62, § 4(c)(6).

67

Gearan, supra note 64.

68

UCMJ, supra note 4, § 818; Military Order, supra note 62, § 4(a).

69

Gearan, supra note 64.

70

Id.

71

Id.
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decides.72 In addition, the Military Order does not attempt to
foreclose habeas corpus.73 As always, the President has the power
to grant pardons to any convicted individual.74
While defendants will have the right to see the evidence
against them, admissibility of evidence is likely to be broader than
in civilian trials and courts-martial.75 Prosecutors will be able to
use evidence that has probative value to a reasonable person,76
which will likely include hearsay statements and documents that
the prosecutors obtained through unorthodox means.77 For
example, maps and writings discovered in abandoned houses in
Afghanistan that passed through several hands prior to U.S.
investigators obtaining them will be admissible.78 Also, the
tribunals will be “mostly open” to the press, unless classified
material needs to be presented.79 Lastly, the military tribunals will
try only non-U.S. citizens.80

72

18 U.S.C. § 1259.

73

Gonzales, Martial Justice, Full and Fair, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 30, 2001, at A27.

74

Military Order, supra note 62, § 7(2); U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 1.

75

Gearan, supra note 64. “Given the danger to the safety of the United States
and the nature of international terrorism, and to the extent provided by and under
this order, I find … that it is not practicable to apply in military [tribunals] under
this order the principles of law and the rules of evidence generally recognized in
the trial of criminal cases in the United States district courts.” Military Order,
supra note 62, § 1(f).
76

Military Order, supra note 62, § 4(c)(3).

77

Gearan, supra note 64.

78

Id.

79

Id.

80

Military Order, supra note 62, § 2(a). The American Bar Association issued a
resolution urging that military tribunals only be used in limited circumstances
and in accordance with fair trial standards. In particular, it urged the
administration not to use military panels against U.S. citizens or others who are
in the U.S. lawfully. James Podgers, ABA Tackles Tribunals Issue: House
Urges Military Panels Trying Terrorists to Operate within Certain Boundaries,
ABA Journal E-Report, Feb. 8, 2002, at www.abanet.org/journal/ereport.
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As evidenced by the Military Order, the Bush
administration has concluded that both the Taliban and Al Qaeda
regimes are military forces and thus all the detainees are within the
jurisdiction of the military justice system, either as prisoners of
war or combatants. These conclusions, however, are not settled.
In order to determine if the conclusions are accurate, it is necessary
to apply the Geneva Convention to the members of those regimes.
F. Application of the Geneva Convention to the Detainees
The Geneva Convention applies because this is an
international armed conflict81 between signatories,82 namely the
U.S. and Afghanistan.83 Its provisions distinguish between armed
forces of a party to the conflict and other armed forces. Pursuant
to the jurisdictional grant of the Geneva Convention, members of
the enemy military and prisoners of war (“POWs”) may be tried by
a court-martial “unless existing laws of the Detaining Power
expressly permit the civil courts to try a member of the armed
forces of the Detaining Power in respect of the particular offen[s]e
alleged to have been committed by the prisoner of war.”84 The
laws of the U.S. – the Detaining Power in the cases against the
detainees – do not allow for trial of military matters in federal
courts.85 In addition to members of the enemy military and
POWs, persons that have violated the laws of war, by fighting as
unlawful combatants or otherwise, are subject to court-martial

81

Military Order supra note 62, § 1(a): “International terrorists, including
members of al Qaida, have carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and
military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property within the
United States on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires
the use of the United States Armed Forces.”

82

Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 2 states “the present Convention shall
apply to all cases of … armed conflict which may arise between two or more of
the High Contracting Parties.”

83

Other relevant signatories include Cuba, Egypt, France, India, Iran, Iraq,
Israel, Pakistan, the Philippines, Saudi Arabia, Sudan, United Arab Emirates, the
United Kingdom, and Yemen.
84

Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 84.

85

See UCMJ, supra note 4, § 821.
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jurisdiction.86 Lastly, when there is a “war,” persons who
participate in an international armed conflict and accompany and
serve with the armed forces of a country surrender their right to be
tried in an Article III court and thus are subject to court-martial.87
The Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees, as POWs or lawful
combatants, or as unlawful combatants who have violated the laws
of war,88 would be subject to U.S. military law and thus could be
tried by a court-martial.89 While the detainees would enjoy
extensive due process protections in the military justice system
pursuant to both the Uniform Code of Military Justice90 and the
Geneva Convention, their rights would not be coextensive with the
protections civilians enjoy in Article III criminal trials. For
example, military tribunals are not required to offer all the
procedural protections guaranteed in civilian courts by the
Constitution in Article III, the Fourth, Fifth, Sixth, and Fourteenth
Amendments, as well as those articulated in various judicial
86

“[T]he law of war draws a distinction between … lawful and unlawful
combatants. Lawful combatants are subject to capture and detention as
prisoners of war by opposing military forces. Unlawful combatants are likewise
subject to capture and detention, but in addition they are subject to trial and
punishment by military tribunals for acts which render their belligerence
unlawful.” Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1, 30-31 (1942). See also note 88, infra.
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UCMJ, supra note 4, § 802.
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Because lawful combatants meet the four requirements enumerated in Article
4(A)(2) of the Geneva Convention, they are POWs. The converse is not
necessarily true. David B. Rivkin, Bringing Al-Qaeda to Justice: The
Constitutionality of Trying Al-Qaeda Terrorists in the Military Justice System,
paper published by The Heritage Foundation, Nov. 5, 2001, available at
www.heritage.org/library/legalmemo/lm3.html. Unlawful combatants, on the
other hand, are those who take up arms but who fail to do so in a manner
consistent with the four requirements of Article 4(A)(2) of the Geneva
Convention. Treatment of Al Qaeda and Taliban Under International Law,
transcript of briefing at The Federalist Society, Feb. 27, 2002, at www.fedsoc.org/Publications/Transcripts.
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Persons subject to this chapter include prisoners of war in custody of the
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armed force in the field. UCMJ, supra note 4, § 802. Each armed force has
jurisdiction over all persons subject to this chapter. UCMJ, supra note 4, §
817(a).
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decisions interpreting those constitutional provisions. Due to the
diminished procedural protections they are afforded, and their
arguably non-military status, the detainees will likely object to the
jurisdiction of the military justice system and argue that they are
entitled to trial in a non-military court with exactly the same
protections as other civilians.
1. Taliban Detainees
Because the Taliban was the official government of
Afghanistan and because the Taliban fighters are members of that
official government’s armed forces,91 the captured Taliban soldiers
appear to be “[m]embers of the armed forces of a Party to the
conflict” under the Geneva Convention Article 4(A)(1) and thus
are POWs.92 As POWs, they are subject to trial by a military court
pursuant to both the Geneva Convention and the Uniform Code of
Military Justice. A senior U.S. administration official, however,
asserts that regardless of whether the Taliban is an armed force or a
militia, it must also meet the requirements set out in Article
4(A)(2) of the Geneva Convention in order for its members to be
deemed POWs.93 Article 4(A)(2) states that POWs are persons
belonging to:
(2) Members of other militias … belonging to a Party to
the conflict … providing that such militias … fulfill the
following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible
for his subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable
at a distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;

91

See notes 23-44, supra, and accompanying text.

92

Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(A): “Prisoners of war … are persons
belonging to one of the following categories, who have fallen into the power of
the enemy:
(1) Members of the armed forces of a Party to the conflict, as well as
members of militias or volunteer corps forming part of such armed forces.”
93

Shanker & Seelye, supra note 43.
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(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance
with the laws and customs of war.
To support its argument that the Taliban must meet the same four
criteria to receive POW status – notwithstanding whether they are
categorized as the official army or as a militia – the U.S.
administration cites official commentary on Article 4 of the
Geneva Convention: “‘regular armed forces’ have all the material
characteristics and all the attributes of armed forces in the sense of
sub-paragraph (1)…. The delegates to the 1949 Diplomatic
Conference were therefore fully justified in considering that there
was no need to specify for such armed forces the requirements
stated in sub-paragraph (2).”94
Accordingly, the U.S.
administration argues that any official army inherently has the four
attributes required by Article 4(A)(2) and that because the Taliban
regime does not possess these four attributes, it cannot be the
official army of Afghanistan.
This conclusion, however, is disputed.95 Commentators
and foreign governments have both argued to the contrary. For
example, some scholars interpret the Geneva Convention to mean
that if a person is a member of the armed forces or of the de facto
government of a country, then that person is a POW
notwithstanding the four requirements enumerated in Article
(4)(A)(2).96 Additionally, The Netherlands, Britain, Germany,
94

Id.
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The International Committee of the Red Cross, in particular, disagreed with
the U.S. position. In a rare press release, it stated that “international
humanitarian law foresees that members of the Armed Forces, as well as militias
associated to them, … are protected by the … Geneva Convention.” Treatment
of Al Qaeda and Taliban Under International Law, transcript of briefing at The
Federalist Society, Feb. 27, 2002, at www.fed-soc.org/Publications/Transcripts.
The International Committee of the Red Cross in Geneva is viewed as the
custodian of the Geneva Convention. Id.

96

Id. Doug Cassell, director of the center for international human rights at
Northwestern University School of Law, further argues that the four
requirements apply only to certain kinds of nongovernmental armed forces. Id.
Erwin Chemerinsky, a law professor at the University of Southern California,
agrees that the detainees are POWs. Red Cross Objects to Camp Photos; A
Federal Judge Will Hear Challenges to the Treatment of Al-Qaeda and Taliban
Detainees, ORLANDO SENTINEL TRIBUNE, Jan. 22, 2002, at A6.
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France, and the International Committee of the Red Cross have
openly demanded that the detainees be recognized as POWs
because they are members of the Taliban and/or Al Qaeda regimes,
both of which are military forces, and were captured during armed
combat.97 British newspapers even attacked the treatment of the
detainees as “barbaric,” noting that President Bush was close to
losing the support and sympathy of the entire “civilized world.”98
The U.S. responded that the international reaction was “hyperventilation” and defended its position that the detainees are not
POWs.99 Nonetheless, under domestic and international political
pressure,100 the U.S. backed away from its position and, while it
has not agreed that the Taliban detainees are POWs, it has agreed
to apply the Geneva Convention to them and afford them all the
protections due to POWs.101 Consequently, it is still unclear
whether the Taliban detainees are POWs, lawful combatants, or
unlawful combatants subject to courts-martial jurisdiction.
2. Al Qaeda Detainees
There is agreement that the Al Qaeda operatives are not
members of the armed forces of a party to this conflict.
Notwithstanding that the Taliban harbored Bin Laden and
supported the terrorist activities of Al Qaeda, Al Qaeda was not the
official army of the Taliban regime as the Taliban had its own
army. 102 But the question remains whether the Al Qaeda detainees
97

Id. See also Aldinger, supra note 51.
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World Asks: Detainee or POW?, ST. PETERSBURG TIMES, Jan. 22, 2002, sec.
National.
99

Aldinger, supra note 51.
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For example, the French and British governments stated that they would have
difficulty transferring any future detainees if the Geneva Convention did not
apply. The Justice Department, the White House counsel, and Secretary of State
Colin L. Powell all advised Mr. Bush to apply the Geneva Convention. Thom
Shanker & Katharine Q. Seelye, Behind-the-Scenes Clash Led Bush to Reverse
Himself on Applying Geneva Conventions, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at A12.
101

Shanker & Seelye, supra note 100; Deborah Orin, Bush: Captured Terror
Fighters Are Not POWs, N.Y. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at 12.

102

RASHID, supra note 2, at 133-40.
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qualify as POWs subject to trial by a military court. The answer
depends in part on whether they fall within Article 4(A)(2) of the
Geneva Convention. In order to do so, they must meet the four
criteria previously mentioned for militia and volunteer corps.103
U.S. officials argue that they do not meet any of the four
criteria. First, it is unclear who commands them. For example,
Khalfan Khamis Mohamed, an Al Qaeda operative, attended a
remote camp in Afghanistan in 1995 and was sent back home to
Tanzania to patiently wait for his call, which he received three
years later to help bomb the U.S. Embassy in Tanzania.104 When
Mohamed was captured in 1999, he told the F.B.I. that he was not
really sure what Al Qaeda was and that he learned only through
news reports who had sponsored his bombing.105 He said he had
never met Bin Laden and did not even know what he looked
like.106 Of course, this may be false. Whether the Al Qaeda
detainees fall within the Geneva Convention’s definition of POW
will depend on all the known information, most of which has come
from prior and/or convicted cooperating Al Qaeda operatives.
Testimony regarding the lack of knowledge of command structure
will be influential in any inquiry.
Second, Al Qaeda has no distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance nor do its operatives carry their arms openly. The Islamic
103

Prisoners of war … are persons belonging to one of the following categories,
who have fallen into the power of the enemy:
(2) Members of other militias … belonging to a Party to the conflict …
providing that such militias … fulfill the following conditions:
(a) that of being commanded by a person responsible for his
subordinates;
(b) that of having a fixed distinctive sign recognizable at a
distance;
(c) that of carrying arms openly;
(d) that of conducting their operations in accordance with the laws
and customs of war.
Geneva Convention, supra note 3, art. 4(A)(2).
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Wiser & Golden, supra note 49.
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Id.
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Id.
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ideology Takfir wal Hijra – a kind of Islamic fascism – is believed
to be the dominant influence on Al Qaeda.107 The Takfir
encourage violence against both non-Muslims and Muslims who
contradict Islam.108 The goal of the Takfir is to create undetectable
soldiers who blend into “corrupt” societies in order to plot better
attacks.109 As a result, to have a distinctive sign and carry arms
openly would be contrary to Al Qaeda’s goals.
Lastly, Al Qaeda does not follow the laws and customs of
war. There are several examples that provide sufficient evidence.
On February 23, 1998, all the groups associated with Al Qaeda
issued a fatwa110 instructing that “to kill the Americans and their
allies – civilians and military – is an individual duty for every
Muslim who can do it in any country in which it is possible.”111
Then in November 1998, Bin Laden stated that “[h]ostility towards
America is a religious duty” and that it was his personal Islamic
duty to acquire chemical and nuclear weapons to use against the
U.S.112 Both of these international declarations of intent are
contrary to the laws and customs of war. Parties to a conflict are
required to always aim at the restoration of peace.113 Al Qaeda has
a stated intent – indeed, a religious duty – to perpetuate war, not
peace.
Also, civilian persons and objects may not be attacked
under the laws of war.114 Clearly, the attack on the non-military
World Trade Center on September 11, 2001, which killed 2,837
107

Elliott, supra note 48.

108

Id.

109

Id.
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A fatwa is a legal ruling issued by Islamic scholars. RASHID, supra note 2, at
243-44.
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Id. at 134.

112

Id. at 135.
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FREDERIC DE MULINEN, HANDBOOK ON THE LAW OF WAR FOR ARMED
FORCES 38 (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross 1987).
114

Id. at 48.
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civilians,115 and the explicit Al Qaeda declaration to murder
civilians, are both contrary to the laws of war.116 Furthermore, the
customary humanitarian law of armed conflict opposes the use of
nuclear, chemical and biological weapons.117 In addition, the laws
of war forbid the execution of prisoners on the battlefield.118
When Al Qaeda fighters captured a U.S. soldier who had fallen out
of a helicopter in Afghanistan and killed him on the battlefield, this
was unmistakably outside the laws of war. 119 Under the Geneva
Convention, that U.S. soldier should have been given POW
status.120
There are many other aspects of Al Qaeda operations that
demonstrate that Al Qaeda does not adhere to the laws of war and
thus does not fall within the Geneva Convention’s POW definition.
It is still unclear, however, whether the Al Qaeda detainees are
lawful or unlawful combatants subject to courts-martial
jurisdiction.
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At the World Trade Center, 2,837 dead or missing. At the Pentagon, 184
dead or missing. In Pennsylvania, 40 dead on hijacked plane. Dead and
Missing, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 22, 2002, at A12.
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MULINEN, supra note 113, at 43, 45, and 48.
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See FRITS KALSHOVEN, CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 159-60 (Int’l
Comm. of the Red Cross 1987).
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Thom Shanker, A Nation Challenged: The Combat; U.S. Tells How Rescue
Turned into Fatal Firefight, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 6, 2002, at A1.
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It may be argued that because Al Qaeda operatives do not meet the first three
requirements, there is no need for them to follow the laws of war, as they will
not be deemed POWs or fall within the Geneva Convention even if they do
follow the laws of war. Furthermore, the U.S. has already stated that it will not
grant POW status to Al Qaeda operatives. However, these arguable facts do not
change the analysis of whether Al Qaeda follows the laws of war. While Al
Qaeda operatives clearly have no incentive to apply the Geneva Convention as it
will not be applied to them, there is a reciprocity argument wherein if Al Qaeda,
or the international community, want the Geneva Convention to apply to Al
Qaeda operatives, then Al Qaeda must follow the laws of war and the Geneva
Convention.
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III.

The Creation of Article I Courts Pursuant to the U.S.
Constitution

Congress has created tribunals pursuant to its Article I
powers in three narrow situations: territorial courts, military courts,
and courts or agencies that adjudicate “public rights” cases.121 In
these three areas, there are exceptional circumstances that allow
Congress, consistent with the constitutional doctrine of separation
of powers, to establish federal courts that lack Article III
protections.122 This article deals only with the second exception:
military courts.
Acting pursuant to its power to regulate armed forces,
Congress has created a system of federal military courts developed
outside Article III.123 These courts do not have the constitutional
protections of the Article III courts in that the judges do not have
life tenure or salary protections. Further, the Constitution does not
require that military courts, commonly known as courts-martial,
provide grand jury indictment, trial by jury, and in some cases, the
right to counsel.124 A court-martial is tried, not by a jury of the
defendant’s peers who must decide unanimously, but by a panel of

121

Ex parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942); Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v.
Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 64-67 (1982) (plurality opinion).
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Generally, the exceptions also apply to Article II courts. However, the
President, unlike the Congress, also has the power to act pursuant to his
constitutional power as Commander in Chief. “The President shall be
Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States.” U.S. CONST.
art. II, § 2, cl. 1. Also, the President has foreign relations power that the
Congress does not. The executive branch powers are beyond the scope of this
article. For a thorough discussion on the President’s power to establish Article
II tribunals, see Maryellen Fullerton, Hijacking Trials Overseas: the Need for an
Article III Court, 28 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1 (Fall 1986).
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“The Congress shall have power to … make rules for the government and
regulations of the land and naval forces.” U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 14. See
also Gosa v. Mayden, 413 U.S. 665, 686 (1973); Kennedy v. MendozaMartinez, 372 U.S. 144, 165 (1963); Whelchel v. McDonald, 340 U.S. 122, 127
(1950); Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39.
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Owens v. Markley, 289 F.2d 751 (7th Cir. 1961). See also Wright v.
Markley, 351 F.2d 592 (7th Cir. 1965); Thompson v. Willingham, 217 F. Supp.
901 (D. Pa. 1962), affirmed 318 F.2d 657 (3rd Cir. 1962).
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officers empowered to act by a two-thirds vote.125 The presiding
officer at a court-martial is not a judge but is a military law
officer.126 Because the courts-martial lack these constitutional
protections, they may only hear criminal matters that fall within
the narrow exception of “military crimes.”127
Notwithstanding the lack of constitutional protections,
courts-martial are justified because the military must have
authority to adjudicate matters in order to maintain an efficient,
well-disciplined fighting force.128 The rationale for criminal trials
in courts-martial is that quick adjudication is necessary to enforce
discipline among American soldiers, wherever they may be.129
Thus jurisdiction over American soldiers is based solely upon the
status of the accused. On the other hand, when members of
another nation’s military forces are tried in American military
courts, the nature of the offense and the existence of war or
imminent threat of war, in addition to the status of the accused, are
significant factors.130
Congress has enacted statutory provisions, the Uniform
Code of Military Justice (“UCMJ”), that set forth both the
procedural and substantive law applicable to military courts.131
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O’Callahan v. Parker, 395 U.S. 258, 263-64 (1969); see also Fullerton, supra
note 122, at 21.
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The UCMJ defines those persons subject to its provisions.132 The
UCMJ then provides that the jurisdiction of courts-martial
generally depends on the accused’s status as a person subject to the
UCMJ,133 rather than on the nature of the offense charged or the
place where the offense occurred. Consequently, there are no
geographical limitations on the military justice system. Rather, the
UCMJ applies in all places where persons subject to the UCMJ are
located,134 and is not restricted territorially to the limits of a
particular State.135
Thus the UCMJ application is clearly
extraterritorial. Courts-martial have power to try any offense
under the UCMJ, including a violation of the law of war, so long
as that exercise of jurisdiction is over a person subject to the
UCMJ.136 There are multiple categories of persons subject to the
UCMJ,137 but only two groups are relevant to this article:
(1) POWs in custody of the U.S. armed forces138 and (2) persons
who violate the law of war. 139 Persons who violate the law of war
are considered unlawful combatants and are thus outside the
constitutional guarantee of trial by jury and subject to courtsmartial jurisdiction. 140
132

UCMJ, supra note 4, § 802.

133

UCMJ, supra note 4, § 817(a).
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UCMJ, supra note 4, § 805; MCM, supra note 131, Rule 201
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Gosa, 413 U.S. at 686. See also Kennedy, 372 U.S. at 165; Whelchel, 340
U.S. at 127; Quirin, 317 U.S. at 39. See also In re Yamashita, 327 U.S. 1 (1946)
(offenses clause of Constitution empowers Congress to create courts to
prosecute war crimes and violations of the laws of war occurring outside the
U.S. territory).
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See UCMJ, supra note 4, § 802(a)(1) – (12) for the twelve categories of
persons subject to military court jurisdiction.
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202(b) and 203.

140

Quirin, 317 U.S. at 37-38, 44.

24

Military courts have jurisdiction over persons who violate
the laws of war by, inter alia, aligning themselves with enemy
military forces for the purpose of committing hostile acts or by
committing war crimes.141 Jurisdiction extends to war crimes
committed by members of the U.S. military;142 by persons,
including civilians, “in an area of actual fighting”143 or in occupied
enemy territory;144 by enemy belligerents, whether military145 or
civilian,146 even if they are U.S. citizens;147 and by citizens of third
141

“War crimes” are principally defined by international law. See notes 195202, infra, and accompanying text for a more in-depth discussion of what
constitutes a war crime.
142

Under the UCMJ, general courts-martial “have jurisdiction to try any person
who by the law of war is subject to trial by a military tribunal.” UCMJ, supra
note 4, § 818. The MCM, supra note 131, § 201(f)(1)(B) (i) is more precise:
“General courts-martial may try any person who by the law of war is subject to
trial by military tribunal for any crime against … [t]he law of war ... .” See also
MCM, supra note 131, at § 202(b) (“Nothing in this rule limits the power of
general courts-martial to try persons under the law of war”). This jurisdiction of
courts-martial does not deprive military commissions and other military
tribunals of “concurrent jurisdiction with respect to offenders or offenses that by
statute or by the law of war may be tried” by them. UCMJ, supra note 4, § 821.
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Reid, 354 U.S. at 33.
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See Madsen v. Kinsella, 343 U.S. 341 (1952) (affirming conviction in 1950
of an air force officer’s wife, by a U.S. occupation court in the nature of a
military commission, for murder in violation of the German criminal code,
committed in the American Zone of Germany); see also Reid, 354 U.S. at 33
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cessation of hostilities or even, for all purposes, with a treaty of peace. It may
continue long enough to permit the occupying power to discharge its
responsibilities fully.” Madsen, 343 U.S. at 360 (citations omitted).

145

See, e.g., Yamashita v. Styer, 327 U.S. 1 (1946) (post-war trial by military
commission of former Japanese commander in the Philippines).
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See Ex Parte Quirin, 317 U.S. 1 (1942) (trial of civilian German military
spies in wartime by U.S. military commission). For the history of U.S. military
commissions, which were originally established to try civilians for war crimes,
see id. at 26-31, and Madsen, 343 U.S. at 346-55.

147
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was an enemy belligerent, he could be tried by military commission. See
Quirin, 317 U.S. at 20, 37-38.
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countries not at war with the U.S., for “grave breaches” of the
Geneva Conventions.148
In addition, when a state of war, a military occupation, or
some other significant military reason exists, military tribunals
may try persons serving with or accompanying an armed force149
and civilians150 for non-military crimes. Oftentimes, these military
tribunals or commissions are functionally distinct from the courtsmartial and are created by the Executive with express or tacit
congressional authorization.151 These military commissions are
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Soldiers or nationals of third party states who commit “grave breaches” of the
Geneva Conventions in international conflicts are subject to universal
jurisdiction under international law.
See generally Theodor Meron,
International Criminalization of Internal Atrocities, 89 AM. J. INT’L L. 554,
572-74 (1995).
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UCMJ, supra note 4, § 802. Every person connected with the military is
amenable to the jurisdiction of courts-martial while serving in a position that
supports the military. Ex parte Milligan, 71 U.S. 2 (1866).
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See e.g. Reid, 354 U.S. at 35; Madsen, 343 U.S. at 356-60; Milligan, 71 U.S.
2 (1866). However, military courts may not adjudicate criminal charges against
civilians based on the threat of armed conflict with a potential military enemy,
Milligan, 71 U.S. at 127, or during peacetime, Kinsella v. Singleton, 361 U.S.
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the crime was committed while in the service. United States ex rel. Toth v.
Quarles, 350 U.S. 11 (1955). This limitation is beyond the scope of this article.
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usually convened during wartime, and have, in some instances
continued to try cases after hostilities ended.152
Like courts-martial, Article II military tribunals and
commissions, which are created by the executive, lack
geographical limitations. Both Article I and Article II military
courts have been established abroad.153 Pursuant to the President’s
war power, there were military tribunals in Germany established
by the American occupying forces in 1945.154
These
extraterritorial tribunals were justified because Germany was
occupied by American forces at the time.155 While the tribunals
applied local law, they supplanted the foreign court systems and
tried all criminal cases against military and non-military persons,
regardless of whether the crimes were military-related or not.156
Similarly, yet in a more unusual setting, the U.S. Court for Berlin
was convened in Germany in 1978 pursuant to the President’s
foreign relations power. It tried and convicted Detlef Tiede, an
East German citizen, for air piracy in hijacking a Polish airliner
that was diverted to the U.S. Air Base in West Berlin. It was an
executive branch military commission created pursuant to the
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Madsen, 343 U.S. at 348, 360. Military officers, appointed by the President,
generally serve as judges of these commissions. Id. They serve for the terms set
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president’s Article II powers.157 It was staffed by an Article III
judge, sitting temporarily in West Berlin, and conducted as an
Article III court, including a jury of German citizens.158
Thus the historical record shows that both Article I and II
military tribunals may constitutionally be established overseas.
Accordingly, if the detainees may be tried by a military tribunal,
that tribunal can be set up anywhere in the world. Assuming that
the Taliban detainees are deemed members of the official army of
Afghanistan, they are subject to courts-martial jurisdiction.
Assuming that Al Qaeda detainees are not deemed such members,
additional jurisdiction issues arise regarding Al Qaeda because the
use of military tribunals to try non-military personnel is rare and
has been used in only very limited circumstances during U.S.
history.159 Nonetheless, as history proves, military tribunals may
try both military and non-military personnel, including civilians.
This extension of military justice jurisdiction is limited, however,
by the availability of Article III courts to hear a particular case.
The U.S. Supreme Court has held that civilians may not be tried by
courts-martial when an Article III court is available.160 Therefore,
the Al Qaeda detainees may be tried in the military justice system
even if they are civilians if at least one of two circumstances is
present: there is currently a “war” or there is no Article III court
available to try them.
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The justification for this overseas non-Article III court is questionable as
there was no real military occupation of Berlin at the time and the German court
system was functional. See Fullerton, supra note 122, for a thorough discussion.
158

This procedure was questionable as German citizens are not entitled to a jury
trial under German law. Such a requirement also ignores that jurors for federal
trial courts must speak English and be U.S. citizens, 28 U.S.C. §§ 1865, 1869(f).
Fullerton, supra note 122, at 11 n. 29.
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Rivkin, supra note 88. The only direct and definitive authority permitting
such trials remains the Supreme Court’s decision in Quirin, which involved a
formally declared war, a fact noted by the Court in its ruling. Id.
160

McElroy v. United States, 361 U.S. 281 (1960); Kinsella v. United States,
361 U.S. 234 (1960); Reid v. Covert, 354 U.S. 1 (1957); Ex parte Milligan, 71
U.S. 2 (1867).
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IV.

The Creation of Article III Courts Pursuant to the U.S.
Constitution

Pursuant to Article III of the Constitution, the judges sitting
in Article III courts have life tenure, assuming good behavior, and
salaries that cannot be decreased during their terms in office.161
This provides political insulation so that judges can uphold the
constitution and law without regard for the popularity of their
decisions.162 Article III courts are meant to provide protection
from majoritarian policies that might be unfair to litigants.163
Article III courts derive their jurisdictional powers from the
Constitution and federal statutes. Because Congress has the power
to create the lower federal courts, i.e. the district and circuit courts,
Congress has the power to define their jurisdiction.164 Similarly,
pursuant to the exceptions clause, Congress can limit and define
the appellate jurisdiction of the U.S. Supreme Court.165 As the
U.S. Constitution and applicable statutes stand at present, the
criminal cases against the detainees must be heard in U.S. district
courts as the Supreme Court and Courts of Appeal only have
appellate jurisdiction over the cases.166
The Constitution provides that the judicial power shall
extend to all cases arising under the “Constitution, the laws of the
United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under
161

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1, cl. 1.
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ERWIN CHEMERINSKY, FEDERAL JURISDICTION 4 (3d ed. 1999).
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See Northern Pipeline, 458 U.S. at 58.
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“The judicial power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme
court, and in such inferior courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain
and establish.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 1. There is disagreement as to how much
Congress can limit the jurisdiction of the lower federal courts. However, that
discussion is beyond the scope of this article. See ERWIN CHEMERINSKY,
FEDERAL JURISDICTION 169-191 (3d ed. 1999), for a thorough discussion.
165

“In all other cases before mentioned, the Supreme Court shall have appellate
jurisdiction, both as to law and fact, with such exceptions, and under such
regulations as the Congress shall make.” U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 2.

166

See U.S. CONST. art. III; 18 U.S.C. §§ 1251 and 1291.
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their authority.”167 The constitution limits the federal judicial
branch to the exercise of its power in cases or controversies that
fall within nine enumerated categories.168 Article III contains no
geographical limitations. As long as the federal court exercises its
power within these nine categories and is staffed by judges
according to the Article III judicial safeguards of independence,
Congress may establish an Article III court outside the U.S.169
V.

Statutory Authorization Providing Extraterritorial
Adjudication in Article III Courts

In addition to the abovementioned limitations on Article III
courts, the statutory grants of criminal jurisdiction to Article III
courts over crimes occurring beyond American borders further
limit the reach of the courts. Congress defines and limits the
jurisdiction of the lower federal courts through duly enacted
statutes. Congress can enact laws applicable beyond the territorial
boundaries of the U.S.,170 but there is a long-standing presumption
that legislation of Congress, unless a contrary intent appears, is
meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of the U.S.171
There are at least seven federal statutes giving the federal courts
167

U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

168

“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising
under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority; —to all Cases affecting
Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls; —to all Cases of admiralty
and maritime Jurisdiction; —to Controversies to which the United States shall
be a Party; —to Controversies between two or more States; —between a State
and Citizens of another State [changed by the Eleventh Amendment]; —between
Citizens of different States; —between Citizens of the same State claiming
Lands under Grants of different States; and between a State, or the Citizens
thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects [changed by the Eleventh
Amendment].” U.S. CONST., art. III, § 2, cl. 1.

169

Fullerton, supra note 122, at 19 n. 57.
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See e.g. EEOC v. Arabian American Oil Co., 499 U.S. 244, 248-61 (1991)
(parties concede that Congress has the authority to enforce its laws beyond the
territory of the U.S.).

171

Id. at 248. In order to ensure extraterritorial jurisdiction, Congress utilizes
either explicit or implicit language to provide extraterritorial application of
federal laws.
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jurisdiction to hear the criminal cases against the detainees.172
However, because only four of them apply extraterritorially, only
these four statutes can potentially be used to prosecute the
detainees who committed crimes overseas.173 These statutes base
jurisdiction on the passive personality principle, which depends on
the victim’s nationality, 174 and the universal theory, which

172

The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-03 (1987); the AntiTerrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (1990) (formerly the Anti-Terrorism
Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2331); the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333 (1991); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (1996); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B (1996); the War Crimes Act of 1996, 18 U.S.C. § 2441 (1996).
173

This discussion is somewhat limited as it can be based only on publicly
available information regarding the detainees. Presumably, there is much more
information regarding the status of the detainees and the actions they have
committed that allegedly constitute crimes. However, much of this information
is classified and available only to the U.S. government. Therefore, the
discussion of potential criminal charges against the detainees will be somewhat
brief.
174

See the Draft Convention on Research in International Law of the Harvard
Law School [hereinafter “Harvard Draft”], Jurisdiction with Respect to Crime,
29 AM. J. INT’L L. 435, 467 (Supp. 1935).
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depends on the nature of the offense,175 rather than concepts of
nationality (of the perpetrator) or territoriality.176
The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990177 provides that
“[w]hoever kills a national of the United States, while such
national is outside the United States,” shall be subject to
prosecution under the Act.178 The Act further allows for the
prosecution of any person who attempts or conspires to kill a
national of the U.S.179 The Act also provides for the prosecution of
any person “outside the U.S.” who engages in physical violence
“(1) with intent to cause serious bodily injury to a national of the
175

Section 404 of the Restatement of Foreign Relations Law of the U.S. declares
that any State has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for offenses of
“universal concern,” such as piracy, hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes,
and “perhaps certain acts of terrorism,” regardless of where the acts are
perpetrated. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE
UNITED STATES § 404 (1987). The federal courts have exercised this “universal
approach” to jurisdiction in numerous cases, see e.g. United States v Rezaq, 899
F. Supp. 697 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (the legislative history of the Anti-hijacking Act
provides a strong indication that Congress intended to provide extended criminal
jurisdiction over extraterritorial acts); United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086
(D.C. Cir. 1984) (exercise of jurisdiction under universality principle is proper,
especially when such jurisdiction is bolstered by fact that two victims of the act
were U.S. nationals); United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y.
1996); United States v. Georgescu, 723 F. Supp. 912 (E.D.N.Y. 1989) (crimes
committed aboard aircraft are considered by both the U.S. and the international
community to be offenses against the law of a nations). While all these cases
dealt with aircraft hi-jacking, they are relevant in that the court construed the
applicable statutes as applying extraterritorially because the crimes were
offenses against the law of nations.
176

See Harvard Draft, supra note 174.

177

18 U.S.C. § 2332 (1990) (formerly the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, 18
U.S.C. § 2331 (1986)).
178

18 U.S.C. § 2332(a).

179

18 U.S.C. § 2332(b). See Yousef, 927 F. Supp. at 680. The federal district
court held in Yousef that 18 U.S.C. §§ 2332 and 371, which together proscribe
conspiracy to kill U.S. citizens abroad, applies extraterritorially. The defendants
relied on the constitution and international law to challenge the jurisdiction over
them for acts that did not occur on U.S. soil, did not involve U.S. citizens as
defendants, and did not result in death or injury to a U.S. citizen.
Notwithstanding these challenges, the court held that the statues were intended
to apply extraterritorially.
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United States; or (2) with the result that serious bodily injury is
caused to a national of the United States.”180 The Act applies
extraterritorially to foreign nationals181 and gives the federal
district courts exclusive jurisdiction.182 Any Taliban or Al Qaeda
detainee who participated in the international armed conflict may
be subject to prosecution under the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1990183
as the armed combat involved killing and attempted killing of U.S.
soldiers and was certainly intended to cause serious bodily injury
to those U.S. soldiers. Because the detainees were all captured
during armed combat, it is rational to infer that they were all
participating in the international armed conflict.184
Similarly, 18 U.S.C. § 2332b explicitly allows for
extraterritorial application and prosecution for any person who,
“involving conduct transcending national boundaries, … kills,
kidnaps, maims, … or assaults” a member of the U.S. armed
forces.185 Section 2332b also provides for the prosecution of
attempts and conspiracies to commit such actions as well. Because
Al Qaeda has engaged in such transnational acts by carrying out
terrorist attacks, including bombings, murder, and airplane
180

18 U.S.C. § 2332(c).

181

See United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673, 682 (S.D.N.Y. 1996).
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18 U.S.C. § 2338 (2000).

183

While the Act also requires that the defendant be “found” within the U.S. for
purposes of establishing jurisdiction, this does not present an additional barrier
to exercising jurisdiction. When defendants are brought into the U.S. for the
purpose of prosecution, the “being found in the U.S.” requirement is satisfied.
This concern was addressed in United States v. Yunis, 924 F.2d 1086 (D.C. Cir.
1984), where the court held that jurisdiction was properly established under the
Anti-Hijacking Act, 49 U.S.C. § 1472(n), when the defendant was “found”
within the U.S. as a result of his having been brought within the jurisdiction to
stand trial for other charges. Yunis, 924 F.2d at 1089, 1092. The same
conclusion was reached in United States v. Yousef, 927 F. Supp. 673 (S.D.N.Y.
1996), where the defendant was found within the U.S. as a result of extradition.
184

If they were not participating, then they may not be subject to prosecution
under this statute.

185

18 U.S.C. § 2332b(a), (b), and (e). The Act is entitled “Acts of terrorism
transcending national boundaries.”
The federal courts have exclusive
jurisdiction to hear suits brought pursuant to § 2332b. 18 U.S.C. § 2338.

33

hijackings against U.S. armed forces,186 any Al Qaeda detainees
may be subject to prosecution under this statute. In addition, the
Taliban regime, by supporting Al Qaeda, has conspired to commit
such acts.187 Accordingly, members of the Taliban may also be
subject to prosecution under § 2332b.
Section 2339B of Title 18 also explicitly applies
extraterritorially to prosecutions for providing, attempting to
provide, or conspiring to provide material support to designated
terrorist organizations188 such as Al Qaeda.189 The federal courts
have exclusive jurisdiction to hear suits brought pursuant to
§ 2339B.190 While this statute applies extraterritorially, the
material support must be provided while the defendant was within
the United States. Therefore, this statute is not applicable to the
detainees captured in Afghanistan.191
Lastly, the War Crimes Act of 1996 provides
extraterritorial application for prosecution of war crimes
committed against members of the U.S. armed forces and U.S.
nationals.192 While no formal war has been declared, “war” has
186

See notes 45-59 and 102-120,supra , and accompanying text.
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See notes 23-44 and 91-101, supra, and accompanying text.
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18 U.S.C. § 2339B(a) and (d). Material support means “currency or
monetary instruments or financial securities, financial services, lodging,
training, expert advice or assistance, safehouses, false documentation or
identification, communications equipment, facilities, weapons, lethal substances,
explosives, personnel, transportation, and other physical assets.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A(b).

189

See Military Order, supra note 62, § 1(a).
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18 U.S.C. § 2338.
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It might be possible to prosecute the detainees for any support they provide to
Al Qaeda while at Guantanamo Bay, which is U.S. territory. However, it seems
unlikely that they could possibly provide any such support while being held in a
prisoner camp. Also, if any detainee had previously traveled to the U.S. and
provided “material support” to Al Qaeda while in the U.S., then such detainee
could be prosecuted under § 2339B. However, based on the known public
information regarding the detainees, this is not the case.

192

18 U.S.C. § 2441 provides that “[w]hoever, whether inside or outside the
United States, commits a war crime” the victim of which is “a member of the
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been defined to include an “armed conflict, whether or not war has
been declared, between two or more nations; or … between
military forces of any origin.”193 Importantly, President Bush
declared that an international armed conflict was in existence
shortly after the September 11, 2001 attacks on the World Trade
Center and the Pentagon.194
The War Crimes Act of 1996 defines “war crimes” as any
conduct that is defined as “a grave breach in any of the
international conventions signed at Geneva 12 August 1949, or any
protocol to such convention to which the United States is a
The relevant “grave breaches” of the Geneva
party.”195
Convention include “willful killing” and “extensive destruction …
of property, not justified by military necessity and carried out
unlawfully and wantonly” during an international armed
conflict.196 Thus, any collateral damages, to persons or property,
and any terrorism, perpetrated since the armed conflict began are
considered war crimes.197
Armed Forces of the United States or a national of the United States” is subject
to prosecution under this Act. 18 U.S.C. § 2441(a) and (b).
193

18 U.S.C. § 2331(4) (1992).
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Military Order, supra note 62, § 1(a): “International terrorists, including
members of al Qaida, have carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and
military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property within the
United States on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires
the use of the United States Armed Forces.”
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18 U.S.C. § 2441(c).
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Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, United Nations Diplomatic
Conference of Plenipotentiaries on the Establishment of an International
Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, Annex II, U.N. Doc. A/CONF.183/9 (1998), art.
8(2)(a)(i) and (iv).

197

This begs the question: when did the armed conflict begin? When the U.S.
started bombing Afghanistan; when the U.S. declared its war against terrorism;
when the U.S. ground troops landed in Afghanistan; on September 11, 2001;
when Al Qaeda first bombed U.S. embassies in 1995; when Al Qaeda bombed
the World Trade Center in 1993; or some other event? Clearly, as evidenced by
the Military Order, supra note 62, § 1(a), the U.S. believes that Al Qaeda started
the conflict: “International terrorists, including members of al Qaida, have
carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and military personnel and
facilities abroad and on citizens and property within the United States on a scale
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The Geneva Convention’s Additional Protocol I, which is
applicable to international armed conflicts,198 and to which the
U.S. is a party, includes as a war crime “the feigning of civilian,
non-combatant status,” focusing on the obligation of combatants to
distinguish themselves from the civilian population.199 Arguably,
both the Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees are guilty of this war
crime as they do not wear distinguishable uniforms.200 However,
there is an exception in Article 44 of Protocol I for “situations in
armed conflicts where, owing to the nature of the hostilities an
armed combatant cannot so distinguish himself.”201 It can be
argued under the rule and the exception that the Taliban and Al
Qaeda fighters are distinguishable because of their “distinctive
turbans,” even though not distinguishable to U.S. armed forces.202
Based on the above analysis, there are several
extraterritorial U.S. statutes that provide jurisdiction to adjudicate
the criminal cases against the detainees.203 Both the Taliban and
that has created a state of armed conflict that requires the use of the United
States Armed Forces.”
198

Diplomatic Conference on Reaffirmation and Development of International
Humanitarian Law Applicable in Armed Conflict: Protocols I and II to the
Geneva Conventions, Aug. 15, 1977, [hereinafter “Protocol I”], U.N. Doc.
A/32/144, 161 I.L.M. 1391 (1977).

199

Protocol I, supra note 198, at art. 37. See also FRITS KALSHOVEN,
CONSTRAINTS ON THE WAGING OF WAR 83 (Int’l Comm. of the Red Cross
1987).
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See notes 23-59, supra, and accompanying text.
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See KALSHOVEN, supra note 199, at 83.
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See, e.g. Shanker & Seelye, supra note 43.
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In order to bolster the argument for extraterritorial application, the
abovementioned statutes that provide explicit or implicit extraterritorial
application can be compared with other similar statutes that do not apply
extraterritorially. For example, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991, which provides
a civil remedy, allows any U.S. national injured in his or her person or property
by reason of an act of international terrorism to sue in federal district court for
recovery of threefold the damages sustained. 18 U.S.C. § 2333. See also Boim
v. Auranic Literacy Inst., 127 F. Supp. 2d 1002, 1003-04 (N.D. Ill. 2001) (ruling
that court had subject matter jurisdiction over suit for damages when plaintiff’s
son was killed in a terrorist shooting in Israel). While the federal district courts
have exclusive jurisdiction over such suits, 18 U.S.C. § 2338, the Act does not
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Al Qaeda detainees can likely be tried under the Anti-Terrorism
Act of 1990 and 18 U.S.C. § 2332b. They may also arguably be
tried for acts in violation of the War Crimes Act of 1996.
In addition to the above statutes, the U.S. Article III courts,
pursuant to international law, have universal jurisdiction to try any
detainee who participated or conspired to participate in an act of
international terrorism.204 International terrorism is defined in U.S.
law by statute enacted pursuant to Congress’ power to define and
establish the punishment for “[o]ffenses against the Law of
Nations.”205 International terrorism includes activities that

provide even implicit extraterritorial application as there is no language
addressing activities occurring outside the U.S. “Any national injured in his or
her person … by reason of any act of international terrorism … may sue
therefore in any appropriate district court of the United States….” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333.
Similarly, the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, which prohibits the Palestine
Liberation Organization (“PLO”) from operating in the U.S., does not imply
extraterritorial application. 22 U.S.C. § 5201-03. Rather, it specifically states
that the PLO “should not benefit from operating in the United States.”
Likewise, 18 U.S.C. § 2339A, which prohibits material support to terrorists,
provides that a “violation of this section may be prosecuted in any Federal
judicial district in which the underlying offense was committed.” 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339A(a). Section 2339A differs from § 2339B in that the former deals solely
with terrorists and the latter deals with organizations that have been designated
as terrorist organizations. See 18 U.S.C. § 2339B.
204

See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED
STATES § 404 (1987). See also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir.
1980); Australian Mining & Smelting Europe Ltd. v. E. C. Commission,
European Court of Justice, [1982] 2 Common Mkt. Rep. (CCH) 264. See also
International Convention for the Suppression of the Financing of Terrorism,
1999, G.A. Res. 54/109 of Dec. 9, 1999; Measures to Eliminate International
Terrorism, G.A. Res. A/52/165 of Dec. 15, 1997; International Convention for
the Suppression of Terrorist Bombings, G.A. Doc. A/52/653 of Nov. 25, 1997;
Protocol for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts of Violence at Airports Serving
International Civil Aviation, supplementary to the Convention for the
Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Action, done at
Montreal on Feb. 24, 1988. These and other resolutions are available at the “UN
Action Against Terrorism” website, at www.un.org/terrorism.
205

U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 10.
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(A) involve violent acts or acts dangerous to human
life that are a violation of the criminal laws of the
United States or of any State, or that would be a
criminal violation if committed within the
jurisdiction of the United States or any State;
(B) appear to be intended –
(i) to
population;

intimidate

or

coerce

a

civilian

(ii) to influence the policy of a government
by intimidation or coercion; or
(iii) to affect the conduct of a government by
mass destruction, assassination or kidnapping; and
(C) occur primarily outside the territorial
jurisdiction of the United States, or transcend
national boundaries in terms of the means by which
they are accomplished, the persons they appear
intended to intimidate or coerce, or the locale in
which their perpetrators operate or seek asylum.206
The Al Qaeda agenda falls within this definition207 and is in
violation of U.S. domestic law, as the various Anti-Terrorism
Acts208 and the Military Order209 evidences.210 United States law
206

18 U.S.C. § 2331(1) (1992). The definition of “domestic terrorism” is
substantially similar with the exception that the acts occur “primarily within the
territorial jurisdiction of the United States.”
18 U.S.C. § 2331(5).
Notwithstanding these explicit definitions, there may be a potential international
concern in that the international community has yet to agree on a definition for
terrorism. See Rohan Sullivan, Muslim Meeting Won’t Define Terror,
ASSOCIATED PRESS, Apr. 3, 2002; Convention to Prevent and Punish the Acts of
Terrorism Taking the Form of Crimes Against Persons and Related Extortion
that are of International Significance, Oct. 8, 1976, 27 U.S.T. 3949.
207

See notes 45-59 and 102-120,supra , and accompanying text.

208

The Anti-Terrorism Act of 1987, 22 U.S.C. §§ 5201-03 (1987); the AntiTerrorism Act of 1990, 18 U.S.C. § 2332 (1990) (formerly the Anti-Terrorism
Act of 1986, 18 U.S.C. § 2331); the Anti-Terrorism Act of 1991, 18 U.S.C.
§ 2333 (1991); 18 U.S.C. § 2339A (1994); 18 U.S.C. § 2332b (1996); 18 U.S.C.
§ 2339B (1996).
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sufficiently defines terrorism to allow for the prosecution of any Al
Qaeda detainees in an Article III court.
VI.

Geographical, Practical, and Political Limitations in
Both Article I and III Courts

While there are no constitutional geographical limitations
on the use of Article I and III courts,211 other geographical
limitations may inhibit the trial of a defendant in the U.S. for
crimes committed overseas.212 For example, the subpoena power
of the court might not reach important witnesses and the defendant
might legitimately claim that lack of witnesses hampered him in
presenting his defense. In the trial of Zacharias Moussaoui, who
has been charged in an Article III court in connection with the
September 11 attacks, there were allegations of unfairness based
on, inter alia, the absence of testimony from witnesses previously
unable to be compelled to testify.213
Other practical geographical considerations include the
location of the defendants, witnesses, and evidence. Questions to
209

Military Order, supra note 62, § 1(a): “International terrorists, including
members of al Qaida, have carried out attacks on United States diplomatic and
military personnel and facilities abroad and on citizens and property within the
United States on a scale that has created a state of armed conflict that requires
the use of the United States Armed Forces.”

210

Islamic law also prohibits terrorism as a crime against humanity, punishable
by any court, called hirabah. It prohibits killing by stealth and targeting
defenseless victims in a manner intended to cause terror in society. Alan
Cooperman, Islamic Law Indictment Sought for Terrorists, THE RECORD
(Bergen County, NJ), Jan. 22, 2002, at A7 (quoting Khaled Abou Fadl, a
professor of Islamic law at the University of California at Los Angeles).
211

See discussion in sections III and IV, supra.
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Fullerton, supra note 122, at 71.
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Neil A. Lewis, Administration’s Position Shifts on Plans for Tribunals, N.Y.
TIMES, Nov. 2, 2002. In response to such allegations of unfairness, the district
court granted Moussaoui’s request to depose two or more Al Qaeda captives
held at Guantanamo Bay. In response, the U.S. government has moved to
dismiss the case, citing national security concerns. Judge Grants Moussaoui
Access to Al Qaeda Captives, YAHOO! NEWS, Sept. 3, 2003, at
http://news.yahoo.com.
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consider include whether it makes sense to fly all the detainees to
the U.S. to stand trial. It would certainly be more convenient for
the defendants if the U.S. established an Article I or III court at
Guantanamo Bay. All 600 to 800 detainees are present there and,
because detainees may be testifying as witnesses in the trial of
other detainees, such an overseas court would also be more
convenient for at least some of the witnesses. However, much of
the evidence against the defendants is likely in Afghanistan.214
When looking to the location of the evidence, it seems more
practical to establish an American court in Afghanistan. This is
likely not possible as there is still much social, political, and
military unrest in Afghanistan.215 In light of the diplomatic
warnings advising U.S. citizens not to visit Afghanistan,216 U.S.
214

See, e.g., Lewis, supra note 213. This assumption is further based on the fact
that the detainees were all captured in Afghanistan and thus their crimes, if there
be any, were likely committed there as well. Because the public information
surrounding the capture of the detainees is limited, it is impossible to
definitively conclude the location of all the evidence.

215

“The ability of Afghan authorities to maintain order and ensure security is
limited. Remnants of the former Taliban regime and the terrorist Al-Qaida
network, and other groups hostile to the government, as well as criminal
elements, remain active. U.S.-led military operations continue. Travel in all
areas of Afghanistan, including the capital Kabul, is unsafe due to military
operations, landmines, banditry, armed rivalry among political and tribal groups,
and the possibility of terrorist attacks, including attacks using vehicular or other
bombs. The security environment remains volatile and unpredictable.”
December 27, 2002 Afghanistan Travel Warning, available at the United States
Department of State website, http://travel.state.gov/afghanistan_warning.html.
216

“This Travel Warning provides updated information on the security situation
in the country and continues to emphasize the Embassy’s limited capability to
provide consular services. The security threat to all American citizens in
Afghanistan remains high. This Travel Warning supersedes that of November
18, 2002. The Department of State strongly warns U.S. citizens against travel to
Afghanistan. … Several United Nations and private humanitarian workers,
including Americans, were assaulted in June 2002 in the northern areas of
Afghanistan in and around the city of Mazar-e-Sharif. As a result of these
attacks, the U.S. Government warns American citizens, including those familiar
with Mazar-e-Sharif, against traveling to or residing in the area. On June 18, an
unidentified group launched rockets within Kabul, and several rockets landed in
the vicinity of the Embassy. On September 5, a car bomb was detonated in
downtown Kabul, killing more than 30 Afghans. On December 17, 2002, a
grenade attack injured two U.S. soldiers in central Kabul. From time to time, the
U.S. Embassy places shopping and other areas frequented by foreigners off
limits to its personnel depending on current security conditions. Private U.S.
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court personnel, as well as the detainees themselves, might be in
great danger in Afghanistan. It therefore seems unlikely that
Congress would choose to establish an American court there.
There is also the political consideration that the U.S. wants
to ensure that persons who attack U.S. armed forces or commit
international terrorism are prosecuted. To allow the detainees’
home countries to try them for their offenses would likely prove
fatal to the conviction. Afghanistan would not prosecute members
of the Taliban, regardless of the war crimes they may have
committed, as they were fighting with the country’s official army.
This is evidenced by the release of hundreds of Taliban fighters in
February 2002 by President Karzai of Afghanistan.217 In addition,
to allow the country of citizenship of the members of Al Qaeda to
try those members would also prove a political and diplomatic
nightmare. The detainees would likely become international
bargaining chips in the U.S. war on terrorism. Trying to reach a
uniform punishment for the same crimes across the international
community would likely be impossible.
VII.

Constitutional Considerations Regarding the Use of
Article I Courts in Place of Article III Courts

Thus far, this article has reached several conclusions. First,
both the Taliban and Al Qaeda detainees are likely subject to
Article I court-martial jurisdiction as POWs and combatants,
respectively. Second, they are also subject to Article III federal
court jurisdiction for criminal prosecutions pursuant to several U.S.
statutes. Third, Al Qaeda is additionally subject to prosecution for
acts of terrorism. The question now becomes: which court should
try the detainees?
In order to answer this question, the
constitutional basis for the use of the military justice system to try
the detainees must be carefully considered and weighed against the
constitutional and statutory jurisdiction of the U.S. federal court
system, while still considering the above mentioned practical,
geographical, and political limitations.
citizens are strongly urged to heed these restrictions as well.” December 27,
2002 Afghanistan Travel Warning, available at the United States Department of
State website, http://travel.state.gov/afghanistan_warning.html.
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The policies underlying the judicial independence of
Article III courts – to protect against biased adjudication, to protect
the courts from political pressure exerted by the legislative and
executive branches to decide the case in a politically desirable
manner, and to protect the ability of the courts to strike down
unlawful action taken by the political branches – are even more
relevant when litigation involves foreign defendants.218 In fact, the
need for an Article III court is particularly great when foreign
defendants such as the detainees are accused of terrible crimes and
the atmosphere is highly politicized.219 On the other hand, given
the amount of negative media coverage in the U.S., it is unclear
that a jury trial in an Article III court located in the U.S. would be
more fair for the detainees.220
Even more essential, though, is that the framers designed
Article III as a restraint on the federal government.221 When the
framers structured the federal government to embody the
separation of powers doctrine they were attempting to limit the
intrusion by one branch into the affairs of another branch.222 They
were conscious of the potential dangers of a strong central
government and attempted to prevent the executive and legislative
branches from exercising too much power by providing a system
of checks and balances among the three branches.223 The
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See, e.g. Felicity Barringer with Douglas Jehl, U.S. Says Video Shows
Captors Killed Reporter, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 26, 2002, at A1; Devlin Barrett,
Inside the Boot Bombs, N.Y. POST, Feb. 8, 2002, at 6. Of course, it is not clear
that the U.S. constitution would require a criminal trial by jury if an Article III
court were established overseas. Indeed, federal statutes require that jurors for
federal trials must speak English and be U.S. citizens. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1865, 1869.
Nonetheless, a jury trial in an Article III court raises interesting questions: who
would be the defendant’s peers? U.S. citizens or foreign citizens? If the jury
were composed of foreign citizens, e.g. Afghani nationals, this would be an
unusual obligation for many foreigners whose legal system does not include trial
by jury. Such was the case in the overseas trial of Detlef Tiede. See Fullerton,
supra note 122, at 11 n. 29.
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structural theory that guided the framers is upset if the political
branches are allowed to create their own courts when there is an
Article III court that has jurisdiction to hear a case, particularly
when the threat of political influence on the tribunal is so great.224
Nonetheless, there are justifications for creating and
utilizing an Article I court. For example, Congress may create an
Article I court out of a desire to keep the federal judiciary small
and prestigious or because it prefers to create a court that has
expertise in particular areas in order to better decide particular
controversies.225 Neither of these justifications seems applicable to
the criminal trials of the Al Qaeda detainees as no new Article III
court is necessary to conduct the trials. Also, Congress may prefer
an Article I tribunal because the judges, who lack life tenure and
salary protections, are less likely to be independent and are more
likely to be influenced by political pressure.226 This justification
may be applicable here, but it violates checks and balances and
separation of powers.
In light of these constitutional doctrines, there are several
factors to consider when determining if an Article I court may be
used in place of an Article III court. One factor is the origin and
importance of the rights that the Article I court is adjudicating.227
The rights at issue in the cases against the detainees are life and
liberty, clearly two of the most basic and valuable individual
rights. This suggests that the criminal cases should be heard in an
Article III court because it provides more constitutional protection
than an Article I court. Also a factor is the extent to which the
Article I court is exercising jurisdiction and powers normally
vested only in Article III courts.228 The answer is unclear. If the
detainees are POWs, lawful combatants, or unlawful combatants
violating the law of war, then jurisdiction in the military courts is
proper and the Article III courts are not being deprived of their
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usual jurisdiction. On the other hand, if the detainees are civilians
and/or terrorists and there is no “war,” then their criminal cases
would normally be heard in an Article III court and giving
jurisdiction to an Article I court would upset the balance of the
carefully crafted constitution.
The ultimate consideration is a balancing test, with the
benefits of utilizing an Article I court weighed against the
disadvantages of an Article I court, particularly whether the Article
I court undermines the doctrine of checks and balances.229 The
benefits in having an Article I court try the detainees is a less
public, less “circus-like” atmosphere because Article I courts need
not be public and may be conducted on an expedited basis. Also,
because the evidentiary rules of admissibility will be different than
in an Article III court,230 the trials are likely to be less time
consuming, which is important considering there are over 600
detainees at Guantanamo Bay. Of the disadvantages, the most
prominent is that a highly politicized trial should not be tried by
the political branches as the constitution was designed to allow the
judicial branch to check and balance the political branches in
political situations. However, Article III courts do not always find
it necessary to balance in such as manner, e.g. when they decline to
hear an otherwise justiciable case because it is a political question
that the political branches should handle.231
VIII. Conclusion: A Solution
Approximately a year has passed since the Taliban soldiers
and Al Qaeda operatives were detained and international pressure
regarding their treatment and detention has waned.232 Most
importantly, domestic pressure for swift retribution for the
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September 11 attacks has faded.233 Accordingly, the U.S.
administration is no longer in a hurry to prosecute the detainees as
a prosecution will halt the ability to interview the detainees in
order to obtain valuable information.234 When the U.S. is ready to
prosecute the detainees, there are several possibilities. One
solution, however, is superior to the others. In light of the
constitutional considerations, recognized exceptions to Article III,
and foreign policy, the Taliban detainees should be tried in an
Article I court-martial and the Al Qaeda detainees should be tried
in an Article III court. This supports the U.S. war against terrorism
by separating the Taliban armed forces from the Al Qaeda
terrorists.235 It also provides a basis for desirable international
reciprocity regarding any future trials of members of the U.S.
armed forces.
This solution is not, however, without faults as the
application of extraterritorial statutes in an Article III court may
subject U.S. citizens to negative reciprocal treatment abroad,
especially when armed forces in an international armed conflict are
at issue. The U.S. cannot hope to prosecute foreign acts committed
against its citizens without subjecting U.S. citizens, including U.S.
military personnel, to similar prosecutions from foreign countries.
In order to avoid this unfavorable reciprocity, the Al Qaeda
detainees could be tried by court-martial as unlawful combatants
and for violating the law of war.
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